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ACHIEVING EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE COMMUNITIES THROUGH
CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION POLICY
NICKY SHEATS*
INTRODUCTION
The Clean Power Plan rule is the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency’s (“EPA”) regulatory method of reducing the nation’s carbon
dioxide emissions and, by doing so, of fighting climate change.1 There
was very little in the original Clean Power Plan proposal that addressed
environmental justice (“EJ”)2 using section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act3
as authorization; it instead featured averaging carbon dioxide emissions
rates4 and facilitated emissions trading.5 The EJ advocacy community
responded to the Clean Power Plan’s failure to address equity by propos-
ing a number of ways that EJ could be incorporated into the proposed
rule.6 The three primary recommendations were: 1) mandated emissions
reductions for EJ communities, i.e., communities of color and low-income
communities; 2) prioritized use of energy efficiency and renewable energy
in EJ communities; and 3) mandatory EJ analyses included in state
plans developed pursuant to the Clean Power Plan that demonstrated
the implementation of the first two recommendations and determined
* Ph.D., M.P.P., Esq., Center for the Urban Environment of the John S. Watson Institute
for Public Policy at Thomas Edison State University; New Jersey Environmental Justice
Alliance.
1 See generally Carbon Pollution Emissions Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources,
79 Fed. Reg. 34,829 (June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
2 Id.
3 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2016).
4 States can fulfill their obligations under the Clean Power Plan by meeting an average
carbon dioxide emissions rate assigned to each state by EPA. See Carbon Pollution
Emissions Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units,
80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,667–68, 64,674–75, 64,812, 64,823 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
5 See id. at 64,672, 64,674–75, 64,839.
6 See Comment Letter on EPA Clean Power Plan, CENTER FOR EARTH, ENERGY, AND DEMOC-
RACY (Dec. 1, 2014), http://ceed.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Clean-Power-Plan-Com
ments-EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0601.pdf [https://perma.cc/LKL6-3C8C].
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the distributive impacts of a state plan on EJ communities within the
state.7 There were other important EJ recommendations such as the
recommendation that states should not be able to use carbon trading to
fulfill their obligations under the Clean Power Plan.8 However, the above
three suggestions were also usually core recommendations.
The final version of the rule does provide what might best be
characterized as an EJ “foothold” by requiring that states interact with
EJ communities during development of their state plans9 and the inclu-
sion of an optional incentive program for the use of energy efficiency in
low-income neighborhoods.10 However, the Clean Power Plan still pro-
vides no mandatory substantive protections for EJ communities and does
not attempt to incentivize emissions reductions for any particular com-
munities, including EJ neighborhoods.11
The Clean Power Plan also places the EJ advocacy community in
an awkward position because EJ advocates want to aggressively fight
climate change but overwhelmingly do not support carbon trading, a
7 See id.; see also Comment Letter on EPA Clean Power Plan, THE ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE LEADERSHIP FORUM ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.ejleader
shipforum.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/Env-Just-Leadership-Forum-on-Climate
-Change-_Docket-ID-No.-EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y499-4NJ8];
Principles of Climate Justice, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE LEADERSHIP FORUM ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://www.ejleadershipforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Principles-of-Cli
mate-Justice.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U4F-XADA] (last visited Jan. 23, 2017); Comment
Letter on The Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, NEW JERSEY ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
ALLIANCE (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.ejleadershipforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07
/njeja-cpp-comments-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DBX-4MBY].
8 Comment Letter on The Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, NEW JERSEY ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE ALLIANCE 13–14 (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.ejleadershipforum.org/wp-content/up
loads/2015/07/njeja-cpp-comments-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XWA-CAA5].
9 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,858, 64,916 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
10 The Clean Energy Investment Program (CEIP) incentivizes the use of energy efficiency
in low-income communities by awarding extra energy credits or allowances, depending on
whether the state is using a rate or mass-based system, to those who implement energy
efficiency projects in these areas. The program uses a similar method to incentivize the
development of renewable energy in general. For information on the program, see id. at
64,675–76, 64,829–32. It is important to note that EPA issued a new proposed rule for the
CEIP on June 16 of this year (2016). See 81 Fed. Reg. 42,939 (2016). However, this Paper
will not discuss this newly proposed rule because the author has not yet had time to
examine it.
11 See Clean Energy Incentive Program Design Details, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,939, 42,340
(June 30, 2016) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 60 & 62).
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policy mechanism the Clean Power Plan at least facilitates, if not pro-
motes.12 The desire to aggressively fight climate change is based on the
belief that EJ communities may be disproportionately affected by a
number of detrimental impacts of climate change including increased air
pollution,13 heat waves,14 increased food prices,15 and flooding that leaves
behind toxic contamination.16 It may also be especially difficult for resi-
dents of EJ communities to recover from extreme weather events.17
This Paper focuses on emissions reductions for EJ communities
under the Clean Power Plan in particular as well as climate change
mitigation policy in general and argues that these reductions should be
both mandatory and planned. The next section of the Paper discusses
why, from an EJ perspective, equity should be an integral part of climate
change mitigation policy; then the need for climate change mitigation
policy to produce emissions reductions for EJ communities is discussed;
this is followed by an explanation of why neither the Clean Power Plan
nor carbon trading programs in general can guarantee emissions reduc-
tions for EJ communities in the manner needed; then a specific mecha-
nism for achieving these reductions under the Clean Power Plan is
proposed; and the Paper concludes with several final thoughts. Many of
the ideas contained in this Paper have been presented before in various
forms in comments submitted by this author on behalf of the New Jersey
12 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,661, 64,858, 64,916; see also Clean Energy
Incentive Program Design Details, 81 Fed. Reg. at 42,939.
13 Ethinios Targaris et al., Potential Impact of Climate Change on Air Pollution–Related
Human Health Effects, 43 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 4979 (2009); see generally Ethinios Tagaris
et al., Sensitivity of Air Pollution–Induced Premature Mortality to Precursor Emissions
under the Influence of Climate Change, 7 INT’L J. ENVTL. RESEARCH & PUBLIC HEALTH
2222 (2010).
14 Marie S. O’Neill et al., Modifiers of the Temperature and Mortality Association in Seven
U.S. Cities, 157 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1074 (2003); ERIC KLINENBERG, HEAT WAVE: A
SOCIAL AUTOPSY OF DISASTER IN CHICAGO 17 (2002); see generally Christopher K. Uejio et
al., Intra-urban societal vulnerability to extreme heat: the role of heat exposure and the
built environment, socioeconomics, and neighborhood stability, 17 HEALTH & PLACE 498
(2011).
15 George Luber et al., Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National
Climate Assessment, U.S. Global Change Research Program, 228 (2014), http://nca2014
.globalchange.gov [https://perma.cc/D8UJ-95JB].
16 Waterfront Justice Project, THE N.Y.C. ENVTL. JUSTICE ALLIANCE (NYCEJA), http://
www.nyc-eja.org/?page_id=311 [https://perma.cc/YZ69-3X9J] (last visited Jan. 23, 2017).
17 MANUEL PASTOR ET AL., IN THE WAKE OF THE STORM: ENVIRONMENT, DISASTER AND RACE
AFTER KATRINA 3 (2006); ROBERT BULLARD & BEVERLY WRIGHT, RACE, PLACE AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL JUSTICE AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA 9–10 (2008).
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Environmental Justice Alliance.18 However, additional ideas, discussion,
and detail are included here.
Companion papers are being authored that will address other EJ
issues connected to the Clean Power Plan and carbon trading. The U.S.
Supreme Court has stayed implementation of the Clean Power Plan;19
however, this Paper is written with the assumption that the rule will
ultimately survive in its current form. If the Clean Power Plan must be
substantially altered due to a federal court decision then another set of
responses from an EJ perspective to these changes could be forthcoming.
I. EQUITY SHOULD BE PART OF CLIMATE CHANGE
MITIGATION POLICY
As specific mechanisms for integrating EJ into climate change
policy are debated, at times the debaters neglect to ensure that all dis-
cussion participants actually agree to the general premise from which
particular ideas flow.20 That premise is that equity and EJ should be an
integral part of climate change mitigation policy.21
18 See generally Comment Letter on Federal Plan Requirements for Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions From Electric Utility Generating Units Constructed on or Before Jan. 8, 2014, N.J.
ENVTL. ALLIANCE (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?document
Id=EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602-22585&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment
&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/KTC6-4X9X]; Comment Letter on The Clean Power
Plan Proposed Rule, N.J. ENVTL. ALLIANCE (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.ejleadershipforum
.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/njeja-cpp-comments-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/KVA2
-5885]; Comment Letter on Air Quality Management CO2 Budget Trading Program, N.J.
ENVTL. ALLIANCE (Sep. 5, 2008), http://www.tesu.edu/watson/institute/documents/njeja
_rggi_comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XVH-3RFW]. These documents are comments on
the proposed Federal Plan, Clean Power Plan proposed rule and Regional Greenhouse
Initiative proposed rules, respectively.
19 Supreme Court puts Obama’s power plant regs on hold, FOX NEWS (Feb. 9, 2016),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/02/09/supreme-court-puts-obamas-clean-power
-plan-on-hold.html [https://perma.cc/RAB2-AY82]; Jonathan H. Adler, Supreme Court
puts the brakes on the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/09/supreme-court-puts-the
-brakes-on-the-epas-clean-power-plan/ [https://perma.cc/9N5X-KQJR]; see generally Jessica
Lyons Hardcastle, Clean Power Plan Arguments Delayed, Full DC Circuit Court Will
Hear the Case, ENVTL. LEADER (May 17, 2016), http://www.environmentalleader.com
/2016/05/17/clean-power-plan-arguments-delayed-full-dc-circuit-court-will-hear-the-case/#
[https://perma.cc/D6RA-6W7F].
20 Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Domestic Climate Change Policy, 38 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10287, 10287 (2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1077675
[https://perma.cc/HLY8-DNA4].
21 Id.
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EJ advocates surely understand that not everybody agrees with
this principle22 but it still remains a critical assertion. This is true be-
cause the fight against climate change has the potential to transform our
society and in the process could either perpetuate or exacerbate inequali-
ties based on race and income that currently exist. The EJ advocacy
community has expressed fears this could occur if equity and EJ consider-
ations are not explicitly integrated into climate change policy but instead
are left to be addressed solely through existing policies.23
A variety of inequalities based on race and income exist in the
U.S., including but not limited to: life expectancy,24 disease rates,25 incar-
ceration rate,26 poverty,27 and unemployment.28 However, the inequity
that is probably most relevant to the issues discussed in this Paper is the
disproportionate number of environmental hazards and unwanted land
uses that are sited in EJ communities.29 There is evidence that the dispro-
portionate number of polluting facilities has led to EJ community resi-
dents suffering exposure to a disproportionate amount of air pollution.30
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Joyce Manchester & Julie Topoleski, Growing Disparities in Life Expectancy, CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE (2008), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-2007-2008
/reports/04-17-lifeexpectancy_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/44EK-W4GM]; Hilary Waldron,
Trends in Mortality Differentials and Life Expectancy for Male Social Security–Covered
Workers, by Average Relative Earnings, U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., ORES Working
Paper No. 108 (2007), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/workingpapers/wp108.html [https://
perma.cc/LG5H-NQ8P].
25 See generally Health, United States, 2012, with Special Feature on Emergency Care,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (2013), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus
/hus12.pdf [https://perma.cc/X46S-SCXB].
26 See generally Marc Mauer & Ryan S. King, Uneven Justice: State Rates of Incarceration
By Race and Ethnicity, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (2007), http://www.sentencingproject
.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Uneven-Justice-State-Rates-of-Incarceration-by-Race
-and-Ethnicity.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3NN-UT3P].
27 See generally Carmen DeNavas-Walt, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage
in the United States: 2012, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Admin.,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2013), https://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p60-245.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8VLD-QJWP].
28 Household Data Annual Averages: Employment status of the civilian noninstitutional
population by sex, age, and race, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (2012), http://www
.bls.gov/cps/aa2012/cpsaat05.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9Q3-Z9NY].
29 See generally Robert D. Bullard et al., Toxic Wastes and Race at Twenty 1987–2007:
Grassroots Struggles to Dismantle Environmental Racism in the United States, UNITED
CHURCH OF CHRIST (2007), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/toxic-wastes-and-race
-at-twenty-1987-2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/YYE7-NB54].
30 Paul Mohai & Robin Saha, Racial Inequality in the Distribution of Hazardous Waste:
A National-Level Reassessment, 54 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 343 (2007); Toxic Wastes and Race
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Many EJ advocates want to use climate change mitigation policy to help
reduce this “legacy” air pollution load on EJ communities.31
II. THE NEED FOR EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS IN EJ COMMUNITIES
There is evidence that a disproportionate number of environmental
hazards, polluting facilities, and other unwanted land uses are located
in communities of color and low-income communities.32 This concentra-
tion of polluting facilities and unwanted land uses has almost certainly
played an important role in the disproportionate exposure to air pollution
experienced by residents of various EJ communities that has been docu-
mented in a number of investigations.33
in the United States: A National Report on the Racial and Socioeconomic Characteristics
of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST (1987), http://d3
n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/unitedchurchofchrist/legacy_url/13567/toxwrace87.pdf
?1418439935 [https://perma.cc/MV6G-9QJ9]; Cumulative Impacts: Building a Scientific
Foundation, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 5–7 (2010), http://oehha.ca.gov/media/downloads
/calenviroscreen/report/cireport123110.pdf [https://perma.cc/DCD6-42LJ].
31 Rachel Morello-Frosch et al., Understanding the Cumulative Impacts of Inequalities In
Environmental Health: Implications for Policy, 30 HEALTH AFFAIRS 879, 880–81 (2011),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/30/5/879.full [https://perma.cc/N623-YHWL].
32 Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States: A National Report on the Racial and Socio-
economic Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites, supra note 30.
33 Michael Ash et al., Justice in the Air: Tracking Toxic Pollution from America’s Indus-
tries and Companies to Our States, Cities, and Neighborhoods (2009), https://dornsife
.usc.edu/assets/sites/242/docs/justice_in_the_air_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/XW3K-NAAR];
Manuel Pastor et al., The air is always cleaner on the other side: Race, space, and ambient
air toxics exposures in California, 27 JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS 127 (2005); Douglas
Houston et al., Structural disparities of urban traffic in Southern California: implications
for vehicle-related air pollution exposure in minority and high poverty neighborhoods, 26
JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS 565 (2004); Manuel Pastor et al., Waiting to Inhale: The
Demographics of Toxic Air Release Facilities in 21st-Century California, 85 SOCIAL
SCIENCE QUARTERLY 420 (2004); Michael Jarrett et al., A GIS-environmental justice
analysis of particulate air pollution in Hamilton, Canada, 33 ENV’T & PLANNING A955
(2001); D.R. Wernette & L.A. Nieves, Breathing Polluted Air, 18 EPA JOURNAL 16 (1992).
See also California EPA, supra note 30, at 5–17. Criteria air pollutants are six pollutants
for which EPA has set ambient air quality standards. These standards set maximum
ambient air concentrations for each pollutant that are not to be exceeded. The six
pollutants are: PM (PM2.5 and PM10), ozone, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitro-
gen oxides (NO and NO2) and lead. For information on criteria air pollutants see the EPA
website at: https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants [https://perma.cc/3Q25-3RT2]. EPA
has designated 187 airborne pollutants as hazardous air pollutants because they can
cause serious detrimental health impacts including cancer. An attempt is made to control
these pollutants through standards that can include best practices and emission limits.
For information on hazardous air pollutants see the EPA website at: https://www.epa.gov
/haps [https://perma.cc/MXK9-A9RD].
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Based on evidence developed by the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection (“NJDEP”) it appears that the pattern of con-
centrating unwanted land uses in EJ communities also occurs in New
Jersey, the home state of the New Jersey Environmental Justice Alliance
(“NJEJA”).34 NJEJA is an EJ organization that has filed comments on
both the Clean Power Plan rule and the related Federal Plan rule.35 Partly,
or perhaps largely, due to advocacy by and advice from NJEJA, the New
Jersey Environmental Justice Advisory Council, and other organizational
allies such as the Ironbound Community Corporation, Clean Water Action,
and Eastern Environmental Law Center, NJDEP developed a nascent cu-
mulative impacts screening tool.36 The concept of cumulative impacts
refers to the interaction, and the risks created and effects experienced due
to the interaction, of multiple pollutants emitted by multiple polluting facil-
ities located in a neighborhood.37 It also encompasses the interactions of
the pollutants with social vulnerabilities that exist in the community where
the facilities are located.38 NJDEP initially combined nine indicators in
a cumulative impacts screening tool to estimate the relative amount of
cumulative impacts in every block group in New Jersey.39 To ascertain if
there was a relationship between cumulative impacts, race, and income in
New Jersey, NJDEP graphed the relative amount of cumulative impacts
34 See STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., http://www.nj.gov/dep/ej/ejcouncil
.html [https://perma.cc/96P6-CLFT] (last visited Jan. 23, 2017).
35 Comment Letter on The Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, N.J. ENVTL. JUSTICE ALLIANCE,
supra note 8.
36 DEPT. OF ENVTL. JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, N.J. OFFICE OF ENVTL. PROT., http://www
.nj.gov/dep/ej/ejcouncil.html [https://perma.cc/C3N7-2ZZ6] (last updated Sept. 13, 2013);
Our Mission, IRONBOUND CMTY. CORP., http://ironboundcc.org/ [https://perma.cc/2RA5
-FX2L] (last visited Jan. 23, 2017); Protecting N.J.’s Waters, CLEAN WATER ACTION, http://
web.archive.org/web/20160306061427/http://cleanwateraction.org/njef [https://perma.cc
/YD9K-4P7E]; Our Mission, EASTERN ENVTL. L. CTR., http://www.easternenvironmental
.org/ [https://perma.cc/SL2P-FTSP] (last visited Jan. 23, 2017).
37 See Morello-Frosch et al., supra note 31, at 879–80; CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra
note 30, at 3; NAT’L ENVTL. JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, ENSURING RISK REDUCTION IN
COMMUNITIES WITH MULTIPLE STRESSORS: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND CUMULATIVE
RISKS/IMPACTS (2004), at 5.
38 See Morello-Frosch et al., supra note 31, at 879–80; CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note
30, at 3; NAT’L ENVTL. JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 37, at 5.
39 See N.J. DEPT. OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, A PRELIMINARY SCREENING METHOD TO ESTI-
MATE CUMULATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 2, 2–4 (2009), http://www.state.nj.us/dep/ej
/docs/ejc_screeningmethods20091222.pdf [https://perma.cc/CBV7-VNVX]. The nine indi-
cators used were NATA Cancer Risk, NATA Diesel, NJDEP Benzene Estimate, Traffic:
All, Traffic: Trucks, Density of Major Regulated Sites, Density of Known Contaminated
Sites, Density of Dry Cleaners, and Density of Junkyards.
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in block groups40 against the percentage of block group residents that are
of color or impoverished.41 A clear pattern emerged as the number of
color residents in a block group increases, so does the amount of cumula-
tive impacts.42 This positive correlation also exists between poverty and
cumulative impacts: the estimated amount of cumulative impacts increases
along with the number of low-income residents in a block group.43 Several
points are worth noting here. First, at least five of the nine indicators used
in the screening tool to produce the figures discussed above were related
to air pollution, so the relationship between cumulative impacts, race, and
poverty can reasonably be taken as an indication that air pollution is an
EJ problem in New Jersey.44 Second, no statistical tests were performed
to quantitatively confirm these relationships and the data is from 2009.45
However, there is no compelling reason to believe that more recent data
would demonstrate a different relationship and the evidence presented
by the figures is troubling. The relationship between pollution, race, and
income demonstrated by these figures and the aforementioned studies
that investigated the disproportionate siting of unwanted land uses in EJ
communities seemingly violates almost everything the country claims it
stands for in terms of equity and justice. This is one reason why many EJ
advocates insist that climate change mitigation policy should be used to
reduce these environmental inequities.
Power plants that will be regulated by the Clean Power Plan46
contribute to the pollution load borne by communities by emitting green-
house gases (“GHGs”), criteria air pollutants, and hazardous air pollut-
ants (“HAPs”).47 Whereas GHGs are considered global pollutants without
40 Block groups are “statistical divisions” of census tracts defined by the U.S. Census.
They are geographical areas that contain between 600 and 3,000 people. See Geographic
Terms and Concepts—Block Group, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/geo
/reference/gtc/gtc_block.html [https://perma.cc/4CLT-KCJ4].
41 See N.J. DEPT. OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, supra note 39, at 5.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 3.
45 Id. at 1–2, 6.
46 Fossil fuel electric generating units that are steam generating, combined cycle, or
combined heat and power and are capable of selling 25 MW to a utility power distribution
system will be regulated by the Clean Power Plan. They must also have a base load rating
in excess of 260 GJ/h heat input of fossil fuel. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines
for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661,
64,715–16 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
47 For the fact that these air pollutants are emitted simultaneously by power plants, see
CHARLES DRISCOLL ET AL., CO-BENEFITS OF CARBON STANDARDS, PART 1: AIR POLLUTION
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direct local health impacts,48 criteria air pollutants and HAPs can have
detrimental local health effects.49 In the context of climate change the cri-
teria pollutants and HAPs are called co-pollutants because they are emitted
simultaneously with GHGs,50 the air pollutants that actually cause climate
change.51 Perhaps the most worrisome of this group of pollutants is fine
particulate matter (“PM”) and its precursors sulfur dioxide and nitrogen
oxides. Fine PM air pollution, all airborne particles less than or equal to
2.5 micrometers in diameter52 (also known as PM2.5), has been connected
through numerous studies to a variety of detrimental health impacts
including cardiovascular disease,53 cardiopulmonary disorders,54 lung
CHANGES UNDER DIFFERENT § 111(D) OPTIONS FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS, SYRACUSE
UNIVERSITY AND THE CENTER FOR HEALTH AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AT THE HARVARD
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH 2 (2014); see also Alice Kaswan, Controlling Power Plants:
The Co-pollutant Implications Of EPA’s Clean Air Act § 111(D) Options For Greenhouse
Gases, 32 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 173, 177 (2015).
48 See TODD SCHATZKI & ROBERT N. STAVINS, ANALYSIS GRP., ADDRESSING ENVIRON-
MENTAL JUSTICE CONCERNS IN THE DESIGN OF CALIFORNIA’S CLIMATE POLICY 2–3 (2009),
http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/eaac/comments/2009-11-03_Schatzki_and_Stavins_attach
ment.pdf [https://perma.cc/SRL6-EMD8].
49 For information on criteria air pollutants and HAPS, see Ash et al., supra note 33 and
see immediately infra in text for discussion in the Paper of fine particulate matter, one
of the criteria air pollutants.
50 See DRISCOLL ET AL., supra note 47, at 2; Kaswan, supra note 47, at 177; Richard
Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading And Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed
Experiment In Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL. F. 231, 257 (1999), http://schol
arship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1177&context=delpf [https://perma.cc
/2EQ4-CGM4].
51 See DRISCOLL ET AL., supra note 47, at 2; see also Kaswan, supra note 47, at 174.
52 C. Arden Pope & Douglas W. Dockery, Health Effects of Fine Particulate Air Pollution:
Lines that Connect, 56 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASS’N 709, 710 (2006), http://www.tandf
online.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10473289.2006.10464485 [https://perma.cc/9RTV-C9RH]; THAD
GODISH, AIR QUALITY 62 (4th ed. 2003).
53 See generally C. Arden Pope et al., Cardiovascular Mortality and Long-Term Exposure
to Particulate Air Pollution, Epidemiological Evidence of General Pathophysiological
Pathways of Disease, 109 CIRCULATION 71 (2004), http://circ.ahajournals.org/content/109
/1/71.long [https://perma.cc/8HSK-7EYM]; see also Pope & Dockery, supra note 52, at
709–10.
54 See generally Douglas W. Dockery et al., An Association Between Air Pollution and Mor-
tality In Six U.S. Cities, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1753 (No. 24) (1993), http://www.scientific
integrityinstitute.org/Dockery1993.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJK3-YWL9]; C. Arden Pope et al.,
Lung Cancer, Cardiopulmonary Mortality, and Long Term Exposure to Fine Particulate Air
Pollution, 287 JAMA 1132 (2002), http://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/194
704 [https://perma.cc/XT62-R7DD]; C. Arden Pope et al., Particulate Air Pollution as a
Predictor of Mortality in a Prospective Study of U.S. Adults, 151 AM. J. RESPIR. CRIT. CARE
MED. 669 (1995); see also Pope & Dockery, supra note 52, at 709–10.
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cancer,55 and premature death.56 The most ominous finding with respect to
fine PM is probably the number of premature deaths with which it has
been associated: an MIT study estimated it caused 200,000 premature
deaths in the U.S. in the year 2005 alone.57 Sulfur dioxide and nitrogen
oxides have direct local health impacts and are also of concern because
they are gaseous precursors for PM.58 Nitrogen oxides are also a precur-
sor for ozone.59
One aspect of fine PM air pollution that has important implications
for the type of climate change mitigation policy discussed in this Paper is
the apparent absence of a lower threshold for health benefits connected to
the reduction of fine PM concentrations.60 In other words, the lower the
concentration of fine PM, the greater the amount of health benefits. This
fact provides an incentive to drive down fine PM concentrations as low
as possible.
III. THE GENERAL POLICY: MANDATORY EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS FOR
EJ COMMUNITIES
Taken together, the facts discussed above would seem to support
the recommendation by this Paper and others for mandatory emissions
55 See Pope et al., supra note 54, at 1132; Dockery et al., supra note 54, at 1753; see also
Pope & Dockery, supra note 52, at 709–10.
56 Fabio Caiazzo et al., Air Pollution and Early Deaths in the United States. Part I:
Quantifying the Impact of Major Sectors in 2005, 79 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 198 (2013); see
also Michael Jerrett et al., Spatial Analysis of Air Pollution and Mortality in Los Angeles,
16 EPIDEMIOLOGY 727 (2005), http://www.scientificintegrityinstitute.org/Jerrett110105
.pdf [https://perma.cc/GR7T-BUKP]; see also Pope et al., supra note 53, at 71; Pope et al.,
supra note 54, at 1132; Pope et al., supra note 54, at 669; Dockery et al., supra note 54,
at 1753; Pope & Dockery, supra note 52, at 709–10.
57 Caiazzo et al., supra note 56, at 198.
58 Short-term exposure to sulfur dioxide has been linked to increased asthma symptoms,
bronchoconstriction, and other respiratory problems. See Sulfur Dioxide Basics, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/so2-pollution/sulfur-dioxide-basics#effects [https://perma.cc/L6K3
-KLC4]. Short-term exposure to nitrogen dioxide (one of the primary nitrogen oxides; the
other is nitric oxide) has been associated with inflammation of the airway and increased
respiratory symptoms. See Basic Information About NO2, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/no2
-pollution/basic-information-about-no2#Effects [https://perma.cc/ZY3E-7R4F].
59 See Basic Information About NO2, supra note 58.
60 See 80 Fed. Reg. 64,995, 65,047 (2015)(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); 79 Fed. Reg.
34,829, 34,941–42 (2014). EPA states that it assumed no lower concentration threshold for
the health benefits associated with reductions in PM2.5 concentrations based on the report en-
titled Integrated Science Assessment for Particulate Matter, which was produced by the
Agency. EPA further states that this document came to this conclusion based on an evalu-
ation of the significant amount of scientific literature that investigated the relationship
between PM2.5 concentrations and health impacts. 79 Fed. Reg. 34,829, 34,941–42 (2014).
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reductions in EJ communities. Those facts are: 1) EJ communities suffer
from a disproportionate number of unwanted land uses61 and a corre-
sponding disproportionate exposure to air pollution;62 2) numerous studies
have shown that air pollution, in particular fine PM air pollution, has
detrimental health impacts;63 3) there are health benefits to driving down
concentrations of fine PM air pollution as low as possible;64 and 4) power
plants contribute locally harmful GHG co-pollutants to the pollution
loads of nearby communities.65
Ideally, the emissions reductions policy would be to intentionally
develop strategies that maximize the reductions of co-pollutants while
achieving a specified GHG reduction goal. This would be coupled with
mandatory emissions reductions from power plants located in EJ commu-
nities. This policy should result in the reduction of harmful co-pollutants
in EJ communities.
However, even if GHG reduction strategies were not intentionally
developed to also maximize co-pollutant emissions reductions,66 as is the
case with the Clean Power Plan, the next best policy would be to require
mandatory emissions reductions of GHGs from polluting power plants
located in EJ communities. This policy would benefit EJ communities
because even without the intentional maximization of co-pollutant reduc-
tion, there should be incidental co-pollutant reductions as GHGs are being
reduced.67 This incidental co-pollutant reduction should improve the health
of local communities.
The primary focus of the policy suggested in this Paper is to en-
sure emissions reductions in EJ communities as part of climate change
61 See Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States: A National Report on the Racial and So-
cioeconomic Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites, supra note 30.
62 See supra Section II.
63 See supra Section II.
64 See supra Section II.
65 See generally supra Section II; see also Kaswan, supra note 47.
66 SCHATZKI & STAVINS, supra note 48, at 19, would go the other direction and strengthen
existing policies that primarily address GHG co-pollutants but that also yield GHG
emissions reductions.
67 The public health co-benefits linked to the reduction of these co-pollutants can be ex-
tensive. See MANUEL PASTOR ET AL., MINDING THE CLIMATE GAP, WHAT’S AT STAKE IF CALI-
FORNIA’S CLIMATE LAW ISN’T DONE RIGHT AND RIGHT AWAY 4 (2010), https://dornsife.usc
.edu/assets/sites/242/docs/mindingthegap.pdf [https://perma.cc/BRR5-LW49]. See also L.
Cifuentes et al., Hidden Health Benefits of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation, 293 SCI. 1258 (No.
5533) (2001), https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncer_abstracts/index.cfm/fuseaction/display.files/file
ID/13022 [https://perma.cc/ZBW8-4R5T] for some quantification of the health benefits of
co-pollutant reductions. See also infra Section V, discussing EPA touting the co-benefits
produced by the Clean Power Plan due to co-pollutant reduction.
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mitigation policy whether the policy is a regulatory approach, the current
version of the Clean Power Plan, or some type of carbon-trading policy.
However, one fear expressed by the EJ advocacy community is that the
Clean Power Plan, or some carbon-trading program, will actually result
in an increase in emissions in some EJ communities.68 This possibility
will be discussed in more detail below. A minimally protective policy
would be to ensure, at the very least, that the Clean Power Plan, or any
other climate change policy, would not result in increased emissions for
EJ communities.
At times, the primary EJ climate change position has been char-
acterized as the desire to prevent increased emissions in EJ communities
under a carbon-trading program.69 However, while increased emissions
are certainly a concern, the EJ advocacy community has consistently also
talked about the need for emissions reductions70 and this Paper empha-
sizes the need to use climate change policy to actually achieve emissions
reductions for EJ communities and not to settle only for preventing emis-
sions increases. Climate change mitigation policy presents our country
with an unprecedented opportunity to drive down concentrations of fine
PM and other air pollutants to levels that have not been achieved by
using other sections of the Clean Air Act alone.71 The political and soci-
etal will that has developed to fight climate change should also be har-
nessed to reduce pollution in EJ communities. If we do not use climate
change mitigation policy in an intentional and planned fashion to help
68 See Comment Letter on Federal Plan Requirements for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
From Electric Utility Generating Units Constructed on or Before Jan. 8, 2014, supra note
18, at 6–7; see also Comment Letter on The Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, supra note
18, at 5–6.
69 See, e.g., Evan J. Ringquist, Trading Equity for Efficiency in Environmental Protection?
Environmental Justice Effects from the SO2 Allowance Trading Program, 92 SOC. SCI. Q.
297, 2 (No. 2) (2011), http://www.eenews.net/assets/2011/03/30/document_pm_01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3C3D-VXHH]; Jason Corburn, Emissions Trading and Environmental
Justice: Distributive Fairness and the USA’s Acid Rain Program, 28 ENVTL. CONSERV.
323, 323 (No. 4) (2001), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/231923515_Emissions
_trading_and_environmental_justice_Distributive_fairness_and_the_USA’s_Acid_Rain
_Programme [https://perma.cc/S6TG-B7WZ].
70 See Comment Letter on Federal Plan Requirements for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
From Electric Utility Generating Units Constructed on or Before Jan. 8, 2014, supra note
18, at 6–7; see also Comment Letter on The Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, supra note
18, at 5–6.
71 See Kaswan, supra note 47, at 177, 192 (commenting that the Clean Power Plan should
deliver emissions reductions that are in addition to those yielded by other Clean Air Act
programs).
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EJ communities now, we will miss an opportunity to help these commu-
nities that might never re-emerge.72
IV. WHY THE CLEAN POWER PLAN AND CARBON-TRADING PROGRAMS
DO NOT ENSURE EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS FOR EJ COMMUNITIES
A state can meet its obligations under the Clean Power Plan by
having its affected fleet of power plants73 collectively meet an average
carbon dioxide emissions rate assigned to it by EPA.74 For the purposes
of this Paper, the important point to be made here is that the Clean Power
Plan does not force any particular polluting facility to meet a certain
carbon dioxide emissions rate.75 However, the Clean Power Plan, in part,
derives the states’ average rates by setting subcategory rates that for the
72 PASTOR ET AL., supra note 17, at 4–5, also makes this argument about lost opportunity
if climate change mitigation policy is not used to decrease emissions in the neighborhoods
that need these reductions the most.
73 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, supra note 46 for a definition of affected
power plants, i.e., power plants that will be regulated by the Clean Power Plan.
74 For average emission rate goals see 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,824 (2015) (40 C.F.R. § 60,
Table 2 (2015)). A state can also fulfill its obligations under the Clean Power Plan by
having the appropriate facilities collectively meet the subcategory emissions rates for
natural gas plants and coal plants. 80 Fed. Reg. 64,833–34 (40 C.F.R. § 60.5855 (2015)).
75 For example, EPA notes that a state could meet its obligation under the Clean Power
Plan by simply imposing the appropriate subcategory rate on each of its affected electric
generating units (EGUs), but then notes further that “[a]lternatively, a state may impose
standards with differing degrees of stringency on various sources, and in fact may be
more stringent overall than its state goal requires.” 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,727 (2015).
It stands to reason that if some EGUs in a state have a more stringent emission rate than
the state average then others may have a rate that is less than that average. This would
seem to be especially true, since EPA also states that an affected EGU does not necessarily
have to reduce its actual emissions. 80 Fed. Reg. 64,779. EPA also states that “[f]urther-
more, as a practical matter, states are free to apportion reductions in a way that reflects
any subcategories of their choosing when determining the emission standards for individual
affected EGUs,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,791, and “[a]lternatively, a state may establish emis-
sions standards for affected EGUs at different levels from the uniform subcategory-
specific emission performance rates, provided that when implemented, the emission
standards achieve the CO2 emission performance rates or state rate- or mass-based CO2
emission goal set forth by the EPA for the state,” 80 Fed. Reg. 64,827, and “[a]lternatively,
if a state chooses, it could apply rate-based emission standards to individual affected
EGUs, or to categories of affected EGUs, at a lb CO2/MWh rate that differs from the CO2
emission performance rates or the state’s rate-based CO2 goal. In this case, compliance
by affected EGUs with their emissions standards would not necessarily ensure that the
collective, weighted average CO2 emission rate for these affected EGUs meets the CO2
emission performance rates or the state’s rate-based CO2 goal. Under this approach, there-
fore, the state would be required to include a demonstration, in the state plan submittal,
that its plan would achieve the CO2 emission performance rates or applicable state rate-
based CO2 goal.” 80 Fed. Reg. 64,833–34 (40 C.F.R. § 60.5855 (2015)).
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most part correspond to coal plants (steam generating units) and natural
gas combined cycle (“NGCC”) facilities,76 and states can also meet their
obligations under the Clean Power Plan by imposing the appropriate
subcategory rate on each of their affected facilities.77 A state could also
create other subcategory rates as long as the state’s fleet of affected
plants collectively meets the average rate set by EPA.78 A state can also
choose to implement a rate-based or mass-based trading program.79 In a
rate-based trading program, a facility can meet its assigned rate, in
whole or in part, by buying emissions reductions credits in addition to,
or instead of, actually reducing their emissions rate.80 An emissions re-
duction credit allows its holder to claim a certain amount of electricity
production with no related emissions81 and can be used to lower the official
carbon dioxide emissions rate of a facility.82 A state is also allowed to con-
vert this rate-based trading system to a mass-based trading system83 under
which facilities can meet their emissions obligations by not only reducing
their own emissions but also by purchasing allowances.84 An allowance
provides its holder with the authority to emit a certain amount of carbon
dioxide.85 In a mass-based system, no carbon dioxide can be emitted with-
out an allowance that authorizes its release into the atmosphere.86
76 For the fact that state average CO2 emissions rates are derived from the subcategory
rates, see 80 Fed. Reg. 64,674. For the fact that subcategory rates generally correspond
to coal plants and NGCC facilities, see EPA, COMPONENTS OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN:
SETTING STATE GOALS TO CUT POLLUTION 1 (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production
/files/2015-08/documents/fs-cpp-state-goals.pdf [https://perma.cc/HSR8-8QMM]. But see
EPA, OVERVIEW OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN: CUTTING POLLUTION FROM POWER PLANTS
3 (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/fs-cpp-overview
.pdf [https://perma.cc/KWB4-48D2] (indicating that steam generating units also generally
include oil plants in addition to coal plants). The subcategory rate for steam-generating
units is 1,305 lb CO2/MWh and for NGCC plants is 771 lb CO2/MWh. 80 Fed. Reg. 64,812.
77 For the fact that states can meet their obligations under the Clean Power Plan by apply-
ing the appropriate subcategory rate to their affected EGUs, see 80 Fed. Reg. 64,667–68,
64,674, 64,812.
78 80 Fed. Reg. 64,827, 64,833–34.
79 80 Fed. Reg. 64,727.
80 80 Fed. Reg. 64,779.
81 EPA has defined an energy reduction credit as a “. . . tradable compliance unit representing
one MWh of electric generation (or reduced electricity use) with zero associated CO2
emissions.” 80 Fed. Reg. 64,834 (40 C.F.R. § 60.5790(c) and 60.5880 (2015)).
82 80 Fed. Reg. 64,779 (40 C.F.R. § 60.5790(c) (2015)).
83 80 Fed. Reg. 64,727, 64,834–35 (40 C.F.R. § 60.5815, 60.5820 and 60.5825 (2015)).
84 80 Fed. Reg. 64,779, 64,835 (40 C.F.R. § 60.5825 and 60.5880 (see definition of allowance
system) (2015)).
85 Id.
86 David Doniger, Understanding the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, NATURAL RESOURCES
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To reiterate, the Clean Power Plan does not guarantee emissions
reductions by any plant at any particular location within a state. This is
true whether or not a state chooses to implement a trading system to
meet its Clean Power Plan obligations. Carbon-trading systems, in general,
do not guarantee emissions reductions from any particular plant at any
particular location.87 Typically carbon-trading programs set an overall
reduction goal and attempt to issue, through either auctions or a free
distribution to polluting facilities, the appropriate number of emissions
allowances to attain that goal, and then allow facilities to trade or buy
allowances from each other.88 This type of carbon-trading program not
only does not ensure emissions reductions at any specific location, it can
even allow increases in emissions at some locations.89 This is also true of
the Clean Power Plan. In the draft Clean Power Plan rule, final Clean
Power Plan rule, and related draft Federal Plan, EPA concedes this is a
possibility.90 For example, in the final rule, EPA states that a “relatively
small number of coal fired plants” and “a number of the highest-efficiency”
natural gas plants may experience emissions increases.91
DEFENSE COUNCIL (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/david-doniger/under
standing-epas-clean-power-plan [https://perma.cc/7X4F-7MBA].
87 For fuller descriptions of the operations of a carbon-trading system, see Lily N. Chinn,
Can The Market Be Fair And Efficient? An Environmental Justice Critique of Emissions
Trading, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 80, 87–89 (1999), http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcon
tent.cgi?article=1602&context=elq [https://perma.cc/9KC5-EGVP]; Alice Kaswan, Environ-
mental Justice and Domestic Climate Change Policy, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10287, 10291–93
(2008), http://elr.info/news-analysis/38/10287/environmental-justice-and-domestic-climate
-change-policy [https://perma.cc/M52R-TTSZ]; Drury et al., supra note 50, at 237–39.
88 Kaswan, supra note 87, at 10293.
89 Id.
90 The draft Federal Plan contains model rate-based and mass-based trading programs.
EPA will finalize one of the trading programs as the state plan that will be imposed on
a state if it does not develop its own plan. See Federal Plan Requirements for Greenhouse
Gas Emissions From Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,965 (Oct. 23,
2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. Pt. 60, 62, 78). Both types of trading programs will
probably be available for states to adopt or customize to their own needs if they so choose.
91 EPA says that the natural gas plants have low emissions of conventional pollutants but
concedes that these pollutants “contribute to adverse health effects in nearby commu-
nities and regionally.” 80 Fed. Reg. 64,670. EPA seems to be indicating that emissions
from these plants could have local effects since it goes on to discuss “localized increases”
and “localized impacts.” Id. In the draft Clean Power Plan, EPA commented that: “. . . as
part of a state’s CAA section 111(d) plan, the state may require an affected EGU to undertake
a physical or operational change to improve the unit’s efficiency that results in an
increase in the unit’s dispatch and an increase in the unit’s annual emissions of GHGs
and/or other regulated pollutants. A state can take steps to avoid increased utilization
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However, EPA also hints that these increased emissions and per-
haps even existing levels of emissions for some pollutants may be “negli-
gible” if they are released by NGCC plants.92 There is a real-life example
in New Jersey that indicates emissions from NGCC plants can be signifi-
cant, especially when considered in the context of EJ communities that are
already overburdened with pollution.93 The Newark Energy Center is a
relatively new NGCC facility located in the EJ community of Newark,
NJ.94 The facility’s permit allows it to emit approximately 1.82 million
pounds of GHG co-pollutants per year, including 139 tons of nitrogen
oxides, 97.65 tons of fine PM, and 19.73 tons of sulfur dioxide.95
of particular EGUs and thus avoid any significant increases in emissions including
emissions of other regulated pollutants whose environmental effects would be more
localized around the affected EGU. To the extent that states take this path, there would
be no new environmental justice concerns in the areas near such EGUs.” Carbon Pollu-
tion Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating
Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,829, 34,949 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 60).
Obviously EPA is aware that increased emissions could harm nearby communities
thus raising potential EJ issues. In the proposed Clean Power Plan rule, EPA also
commented on the potential local impacts of emissions increases when it stated: “Such
plants would have more hours in the year in which they operate and emit pollutants,
including pollutants whose environmental effects if any would be localized rather than
global as is the case with GHG emissions. 79 Fed. Reg. 34,950.
In the draft Federal Plan, EPA commented that increased utilization of some NGCC
facilities could affect concentrations of fine PM, ozone and nitrogen oxides by making
“periods of relatively high concentrations more frequent”. Federal Plan Requirements for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 65,051.
92 In the proposed rule and Federal Plan, EPA cites a previous EPA action and studies
that either assert or assume that emissions or impacts of certain pollutants (HAPs, SO2,
PM, and mercury) released by natural gas plants are negligible. Federal Plan Require-
ments for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Electric Utility Generating Units, supra note
91, at 65,051; Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, supra note 91, at 34,950.
93 See NJDEP Fact Sheet infra, note 94.
94 The NJDEP Fact Sheet for the then-proposed Hess Newark Energy Center NGCC
plant indicated that, at the time, the City of Newark was 85.7% of color and the com-
parable percentage for the entire state was 34.0%. The Fact Sheet also indicated the City
was disproportionately low-income since it showed that 28.5% of Newark residents lived
below the poverty line whereas the comparable percentage for the entire state was 8.5%.
See STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, Fact Sheet For
Hess Newark Energy Center, Doremus Avenue and Delancy Street, Program Interest
Number 08857, Permit Activity Number BOP11000, Application For Air Pollution Control
Operating Permit and Federal Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) of Air Quality
Permit and Acid Rain Permit, at 19.
95 The permit also allows emissions of 34.99 tons per year of volatile organic compounds,
483.7 tons per year of carbon monoxide, 67.17 tons per year of total suspended particulates,
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NJDEP seems to believe that, in addition to being an EJ commu-
nity, Newark is also a community with a relatively high level of cumula-
tive impacts as evidenced by its comment that the city is an “ . . . area
where the NJDEP has recognized there are disproportionate impacts
from multiple sources of pollution.”96 From an EJ perspective, a potential
two million pounds of co-pollutants each year released into an overbur-
dened EJ community is certainly a significant amount of pollution and
any increases in this emissions load should be prevented by the Federal
Plan offered by EPA and by state plans developed pursuant to the Clean
Power Plan.
Of course, this Paper has argued that one of the EJ goals with
respect to state plans under the Clean Power Plan should go beyond
preventing emissions increases and ensure emissions reductions for EJ
communities. The Clean Power Plan is probably the most important rule
ever promulgated by EPA, but, as it is currently constructed, does not
ensure emissions reductions for the communities that arguably need
them the most. Most EJ advocates believe that the Clean Power Plan will
certainly deliver reductions to a number of EJ communities but impor-
tant questions remain, including how many EJ communities will receive
101.27 tons per year of PM10, 8.22 tons per year of hazardous air pollutants, 10.57 tons
per year of sulfuric acid, 119 tons per year of ammonia, and 2,000,000 tons per year of
carbon dioxide equivalents. See Air Pollution Control Permit Minor Modification and
Preconstruction Approval, Permit Activity Number: BOP140001, Program Interest Number:
08857, Section C, pp. 10–11. The total amount of GHG co-pollutants was calculated by
adding up most of the different amounts of GHG co-pollutants contained in tables on
pages 10 and 11 of the permit. Three different totals were calculated in an attempt to avoid
the possible double counting of pollutants. A total of 1,833,160 pounds of co-pollutants
was calculated by totaling all of the co-pollutants listed above (and in the text) except
PM2.5 and TSP (total suspended particles). These two pollutants were excluded because
it is possible that both pollutants are accounted for by the amount of emissions listed for
PM10. PM2.5 is a part of PM10 by definition. (The definition of PM10 is airborne particles less
than or equal to 10 micrometers). See Particulate Matter (PM) Basics, EPA https://www
.epa.gov/pm-pollution/particulate-matter-pm-basics#PM [https://perma.cc/D5CP-C3NG]
(defining PM10 as airborne particles less than or equal to 10 micrometers). In this in-
stance NJDEP believes that PM10 is a more accurate measure of PM emissions from the
plan than TSP (author communication with NJDEP). If both PM10 and TSP are included
in the calculation and only PM2.5 is excluded then the total amount of co-pollutants
emitted increases to 1,907,500. Another calculation was performed to account for the
possibility that the total amount listed for volatile organic compounds included hazardous
air pollutants (HAPs). This calculation excluded HAPs PM2.5, and TSP, and yielded a
total of 1,816,720 pounds of co-pollutants. Because it is a GHG, methane was also ex-
cluded from the calculations even though it was listed in one of the tables.
96 NJDEP Fact Sheet, supra note 94, at 24.
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reductions, which EJ communities will receive reductions, and what will
be the extent of the reductions.97 Many in the EJ advocacy community
also believe that if EJ and equity are actually the priority as claimed by
so many, including policymakers and the environmental community, then
these questions should not be left to be answered by the market alone
but should be subjected to intentional planning.98
V. A SPECIFIC MECHANISM FOR ACHIEVING EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS
IN EJ COMMUNITIES
Perhaps the most direct and simplest way to achieve emissions
reductions in EJ communities under the Clean Power Plan is to force
polluting facilities located in EJ communities to meet a reduced carbon
dioxide emissions rate without the use of emissions credits and thus
achieve an absolute reduction in emissions. States could choose between
one of two carbon dioxide emissions rates to impose on identified facili-
ties: 1) a 25% reduction from its 2012 rate, or 2) the appropriate subcate-
gory rate as set by the Clean Power Plan as long as this rate represents
at least a 25% reduction from its 2012 rate.99 The subcategory rates are
771 lbs CO2 /MWh for NGCC facilities and 1305 lbs CO2 /MWh for coal
burning facilities.100 It is assumed a state would choose to impose the
rate it believes is the easiest to administer. Whichever rate is chosen must
yield at least a 25% absolute reduction in emissions for EJ communities.
Therefore, a state would have to calculate the actual mass of carbon diox-
ide emitted by each plant in an EJ community in 2012 and ensure that
the reduced rate resulted in an actual 25% reduction in emissions for
each plant in question for the year in question. What needs to be pre-
vented is a plant in an EJ community achieving the reduced emission
rate but not actually achieving a 25% reduction in the amount of emis-
sions because its hours of operation may have changed. Similarly, a state
using a mass-based system would also ensure that each plant in an EJ
community achieved a 25% reduction in the total amount of carbon
dioxide emissions it released in 2012.
As with any new proposal, there are several issues connected to
this recommendation that need to be explored. One of the most important
97 SCHATZKI & STAVIN, supra note 48, at 2.
98 Chinn, supra note 87, at 87–90, 113.
99 See The Clean Power Plan: Key Topics and Issues, EPA 5, https://www.epa.gov/sites/pro
duction/files/2015-11/documents/cpp-key-topics.pdf [https://perma.cc/WU22-CGEJ] (stating
that 2012 is the year EPA used for its baseline emissions calculations).
100 See generally COMPONENTS OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN, supra note 76.
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is defining an EJ community. It is recommended that stakeholder groups
be created to answer this question. A federal stakeholder group could be
created by EPA to provide guidance for all states. Then each state could
form its own stakeholder group who would have the authority to make
a binding decision for that particular state. Another issue could be what
to do about power plants that are not actually located in an EJ commu-
nity but that affect one or more EJ communities. The resolution of this
issue would be left up to the stakeholder group that defined an EJ commu-
nity for the state. The best way to proceed might be to model emissions
from the plants in question to determine their impact on the EJ commu-
nity; then the stakeholder group would decide if that impact is enough
to warrant that the plants be forced to meet the emissions rate that state
chose for plants operating in EJ communities. Yet another issue might
be that a NGCC plant located in an EJ community might have difficulty
decreasing its emission rate if it is already operating at maximum effi-
ciency. Such a plant might be forced to reduce its hours of operation in
order to reduce its emissions. This could force a plant in another part of
the state or elsewhere to increase its hours of operation in order to fill an
electricity generation gap. Increased emissions would probably follow an
increase in operating hours and this could present a dilemma: in attempt-
ing to reduce pollution in EJ neighborhoods, emissions could be increased
elsewhere. This is very nearly the set of circumstances that EPA foresees
may cause local increases in emissions under the Clean Power Plan.101
There could be several ways to address this problem. The best-case scenario
would be that renewable energy and energy efficiency could be used to
prevent a generation gap and there would actually be no increases in emis-
sions. Alternatively, a plant could be chosen for increased operation that
is in a relatively unpopulated area or in an area with a relatively low
amount of total pollution or low number of pollution sources. Stakeholder
groups could be called upon to provide input in such a situation or actually
decide which, if any, plant should run more.
But the most important question may be why the emissions re-
duction goal for EJ communities is set at 25%. EPA has estimated that
the Clean Power Plan, when fully implemented, will achieve a 32% reduc-
tion in carbon dioxide emissions.102 In order for the Clean Power Plan to
be equitable, a comparable amount of emissions reduction should be
achieved for EJ communities. The goal for EJ communities is set below
101 See discussion, supra Section III.
102 EPA estimates that by 2030 The Clean Power Plan if fully implemented should achieve
a 32% reduction below 2005 carbon dioxide emissions levels. Fed. Plan Requirements for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,679.
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32% in order to make it easier to attain and therefore to give states more
flexibility in how they achieve it. The local stakeholder group could ad-
vise its state on measures that could be taken by plants and states to
meet the reduced amount of emissions.
Perhaps the most important aspect of this recommendation is that
the decisions surrounding the efforts to reduce emissions in EJ communi-
ties would be made purposely and intentionally. In other words, they
would be planned and not left totally to the operation of the market.
Others have made similar proposals.103 For example, in one of her
papers, Professor Alice Kaswan discusses the possibility of having all
facilities reduce emissions to some extent before allowing trading.104
She105 and other authors106 also discuss the idea of restricting trading in
EJ and overburdened neighborhoods in an effort to protect these areas
from increased emissions.107 It should be noted, however, that depending
on the initial allocation of allowances in a mass-based system, or the
initial facility emissions rate in a rate-based system, restricting trading
will not necessarily result in emissions reductions for those areas.108 But
even a discussion of trade restrictions displays what at least some in the
EJ community might consider a healthy willingness to explore restricting
the private market in order to address EJ issues.109
Another method that could be used in an attempt to address emis-
sions reductions in EJ residential communities, but that would be much
less preferred by the EJ advocacy community than the policy discussed
above, would be an EJ emissions reductions incentive program. Unlike
the CEIP, this program created from an EJ perspective would provide
incentives that would not necessarily reinforce a carbon-trading system.110
103 Kaswan, supra note 20, at 10304.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 10305.
106 See, e.g., PASTOR ET AL., supra note 67, at 23; Drury et al., supra note 50, at 285; David
E. Adelman, The Collective Origins of Toxic Air Pollution: Implications for Greenhouse Gas
Trading and Toxic Hotspots, 88 IND. L.J. 273, 328–31 (2013), http://ilj.law.indiana
.edu/articles/88/88_1_Adelman.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZD89-3CPN]. It should be noted, how-
ever, that Professor Adelman believes the occurrences of “hotspots” would be rare. Adelman,
supra, at 328; see also James K. Boyce & Manuel Pastor, Cooling the Planet, Clearing the
Air: Climate Policy, Carbon Pricing, and Co-Benefits, 47–54 (Economics for Equity and
the Environment Network, 2012), https://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/242/docs/Cooling
_the_Planet_Sept2012.pdf.
107 Chinn, supra note 87, at 113.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 See supra note 10 (offering a short explanation of the CEIP).
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A facility located in an EJ community that reduced its emissions would
be awarded tax breaks or some other type of subsidy. This program is
much less preferred than the one outlined above because it is voluntary
and therefore might not result in emissions reductions in many of the
targeted communities.
VI. DISCUSSING COUNTERARGUMENTS
There are several frequently heard arguments against mandating
emissions reductions for EJ communities in climate change mitigation
policy, especially in the context of the Clean Power Plan or a carbon-trading
system in general. In this section of the Paper, there is an attempt to dis-
cuss those arguments from an EJ perspective.
One counterargument is that the Clean Air Act directly limits
concentrations of non-GHG air pollutants to safe levels, so there is no
need to affect the efficiency of the Clean Power Plan or any carbon-
trading system by using it to address co-pollutants.111 The response to
this argument is actually contained in the discussion above: by using
climate change policy in addition to the sections of the Clean Air Act that
are already being utilized, concentrations of GHG co-pollutants might be
driven down to levels not previously attained.112 In fact, EPA is touting the
additional lives that will be saved and the additional amount of pollution
that will be reduced by the Clean Power Plan.113 From an EJ perspective,
the problem with trumpeting these benefits is that it is not at all clear
to what extent they will be felt in overburdened EJ communities.114
Another counterargument usually comes in the form of a sugges-
tion—that we should wait to see if there are any emissions increases, or
111 For example, the Clean Air Act sets limits on the ambient concentrations of six “criteria”
air pollutants, see Kaswan, supra note 47.
112 See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 67, at 4–5.
113 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, The Clean Power Plan, By The Numbers,
Cutting Carbon From Power Plants (2011), https://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet
-clean-power-plan-numbers [https://perma.cc/UVY6-KUYY] (stating that the rule “will
reduce pollutants that contribute to soot and smog, and make people sick, by over 20
percent”). It seems EPA is at least referring to sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide (a
nitrogen oxide) because the fact sheet says the former will be reduced by 318,000 tons per
year and the latter by 282,000 tons per year. It also states the Clean Power Plan, by
reducing exposure to PM and ozone, will prevent between 1,500 to 3,600 premature
deaths; 90,000 asthma attacks; up to 1,700 heart attacks; 1,700 hospital admissions; and
300,000 missed school days.
114 Id. The EPA did not specify any of these benefits.
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what the distribution of emissions reductions will be under the Clean
Power Plan or any carbon-trading scheme before intervening and reduc-
ing the efficiency of market-based policy.115 One reply to this argument
has actually already been given above. The distribution and intensity of
emissions reductions for EJ communities, or of emissions increases for that
matter, should not be left solely for the market to decide. These impor-
tant equity questions should be intentionally and purposefully planned.
This is especially true since the distribution of emissions reductions and
increases could change over time.116
A third counterargument is based on several studies that found
no disproportionate detrimental impacts on EJ communities connected
to the sulfur dioxide trading program.117 Perhaps the most discussed or
cited of these investigations include Corburn,118 Shadbegian et al.,119 and
Ringquist.120 One query to be made about all three studies is whether
their findings can be generalized to all emissions trading programs, and
to the Clean Power Plan in particular, since it is not clear whether a sulfur
dioxide trading program can be directly equated to a carbon dioxide
trading program. A detailed reading of these studies also shows that
their findings are not inconsistent with a recommendation that the location
and intensity of emissions reductions under the Clean Power Plan should
be planned and purposeful, at least with respect to EJ communities.121
Although Professor Corburn did in general find no disproportionate im-
pacts on EJ communities due to the sulfur-trading program,122 he also
found that the majority of plants (73 of 110) in the early stages of the
program actually increased sulfur dioxide emissions.123
115 Chinn, supra note 87, at 113.
116 THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE ECONOMICS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE 197, http://www.oecd.org/greengrowth/greeneco/29173911.pdf [https://
perma.cc/DL2M-RVS4].
117 See generally Corburn, supra note 69; Ringquist, supra note 69; Shadbegian et al.,
infra note 119.
118 Corburn, supra note 69.
119 Ronald J. Shadbegian, Wayne B. Gray and Cynthia L. Morgan, Benefits and Costs
from Sulfur dioxide Trading: A Distributional Analysis, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION AGENCY, NAT’L CENTER FOR ENVTL. ECON., Working Paper #05-09 (2005).
120 Ringquist, supra note 69.
121 See generally Corburn, supra note 69; Ringquist, supra note 69; Shadbegian et al.,
supra note 119.
122 See, e.g., Corburn, supra note 69, at 323 (stating that the sulfur dioxide trading program
did not disproportionately concentrate emissions in low-income and of-color neighborhoods).
123 Corburn, supra note 69, at 327.
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These findings are consistent with those of Rebecca Stanfield, who
determined in a later phase of the sulfur dioxide trading program that
300 of the 500 “dirtiest” facilities had actually increased sulfur dioxide
emissions.124 If a significant number of plants in a trading program are
actually going to experience increased emissions at some point during
the program it would seem a certain amount of planning is in order since
the communities near those plants may experience increased detrimental
health impacts. Shadbegian et al. concluded there were no significant
environmental injustices due to the sulfur dioxide trading program,125
but they also found that: 1) 25% of plants had negative impacts on
African-American communities; 2) 10% of plants had negative impacts
on Latino communities; and 3) “the poor received slightly less of the
benefits than the costs from SO2 reductions.”
126 From an EJ perspective,
the fact that 25% of the plants in the trading program had negative
impacts on African-American communities is troubling, and the fact that
10% of the plants negatively affected Latino communities is not encour-
aging. Similarly, the conclusion that the sulfur dioxide trading program
had not disproportionately concentrated emissions in of-color communi-
ties is not the only interesting finding made by Professor Ringquist.127 He
also found that poverty may be associated with smaller emissions reduc-
tions,128 and that the trading program tended to concentrate sulfur dioxide
emissions in areas with relatively low educational achievement.129 Taken
together, it would seem reasonable to conclude that some of the findings
of the above-discussed studies raise not only an EJ issue, but also issues
related to non-EJ communities.
Adelman and Schatzki & Stavins raise another possible counter-
argument. They point out that in relative terms, power plant GHG co-
pollutants may represent a small amount of the total pollution load
facing an overburdened community;130 however, several issues must be
considered in connection with this observation. The first is that although
124 Rebecca Stanfield, Darkening Skies: Trends Towards Increasing Power Plants Emis-
sions, U.S. PIRG EDUCATION FUND AND CLEAN THE AIR: NATIONAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST
DIRTY POWER 1, 1, 7 (2002), https://www.csu.edu/cerc/documents/DarkeningSkies.pdf [https://
perma.cc/D4FP-3WMT] (examining data from 1995–2000); see also Corburn, supra note
69, at 325 (examining data from 1996–1997).
125 Shadbegian et al., supra note 119, at 18–19.
126 Id. at 17–18.
127 Ringquist, supra note 69, at 2, 23.
128 Id. at 21.
129 Id. at 2, 22–23.
130 See Adelman, supra note 106, at 277, 330–31; SCHATZKI & STAVINS, supra note 48, at 6.
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pollution from power plants may represent a relatively small portion of
a community’s pollution, it could still represent a significant absolute
amount of pollution. For example, Professor Adelman estimated that
industrial air pollution causes a cancer risk greater than ten in a million
in approximately 1,180 census tracts in the country.131 Industrial air
pollution would thus seem to be a significant health risk in our nation
that needs to be addressed.132
The relatively small portion of the total air pollution, but significant
amount of absolute air pollution, that Adelman and Schatzki & Stavins
estimate that industrial air pollution represents also leads us back to the
issue of cumulative impacts.133 The reason that industrial air pollution
might represent a relatively small share of a community’s total pollution
load is because that load in our country is so large.134 But the solution to
reducing this large load is not to ignore relatively small sources of pollution.
Addressing this cumulative pollution means addressing the multiple
sources that cause it. This is especially true when a vehicle such as the
Clean Power Plan, or climate change mitigation policy in general, is avail-
able for utilization; however, using climate change mitigation policy, and
more specifically the mandatory emissions reduction policy for EJ commu-
nities suggested above, should only be one of multiple policies developed to
fight the high level of cumulative impacts in many EJ communities. A
coherent cumulative set of policies is needed to fight cumulative impacts.
Before leaving this discussion of counterarguments, it is important
to reference a recently released research brief that examines an existing
emissions trading program and may provide support for the recommenda-
tion of mandatory emissions reductions in EJ communities. Cushing et al.
released analyses that showed that 61% of the highest emitting facilities in
California’s carbon trading program increased GHG emissions.135 They
131 Adelman, supra note 106, at 312.
132 Power plants’ air pollution would account for only a portion of this risk. But see Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2) (setting a goal of reducing cancer risk from HAPs for the
most exposed individual to less than one a million). Therefore, the cancer risk connected
to power plant air pollution might exceed this number in a significant number of census
tracts, even if it is a relatively small portion of the overall amount of industrial pollution.
133 Adelman, supra note 106, at 308–09.
134 Id. (observing that the average cumulative cancer risk in the U.S. from HAP’s has only
been estimated at 50 in a million).
135 Lara J. Cushing et al., A Preliminary Environmental Equity Assessment of California’s
Cap-And-Trade Program, USC DORNSIFE PROGRAM FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND
REGIONAL EQUITY; SCHOOL OF HEALTH, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY; BERKELEY,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA COLLEGE OF NATURAL RESOURCES; OCCIDENTAL COLLEGE, LOS
ANGELES 4 (2016).
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also found that “[n]eighborhoods near the top-emitting facilities that
increased emissions had higher proportions of people of color than neigh-
borhoods near top-emitting facilities that decreased their emissions.”136
These results might confirm fears that carbon trading can lead to emis-
sions increases for EJ communities; however, for several reasons caution
must be used before applying the results to the Clean Power Plan. First,
the results are only from the earliest stages of California’s program137
and might change.138 Second, just as with the sulfur dioxide trading pro-
gram investigations, it is not clear that the California program can be
equated to the Clean Power Plan.139 Even with these caveats, however,
the Cushing et al. findings are sure to generate renewed discussion over
the EJ impacts on carbon trading.
CONCLUSION
There has been tension for years between the EJ and environmen-
tal communities over climate change mitigation policy, and most of it has
centered on carbon-trading.140 But the two communities, along with several
other sectors, including philanthropy, are attempting to find common
ground on how to fight this worldwide threat.141 In this Paper, one of the
EJ community’s primary goals with respect to climate change mitigation
policy is discussed—obtaining emissions reductions in EJ communities—
and a specific mechanism is offered to achieve this goal. But this recom-
mendation is not intended to be a solution that ends discussion; instead,
it is meant to provoke and promote an open and honest discourse. It is
understood that no individual participant or community in the discussion
is likely to agree with all the ideas expressed in this Paper, even those
participants from the EJ community.
One of the key messages to be delivered during the discussion is
that we should not miss the opportunity that climate change mitigation pol-
icy offers to reduce pollution in overburdened EJ communities. Another
136 Id.
137 See id. at 1 (referring to the study as a “preliminary evaluation” and analyzing data
from the California program’s first compliance period).
138 Id. at 10.
139 Compare Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, supra note 9 (showing that the Clean Power Plan
covers only electricity generating facilities), with Cushing et al., supra note 135, at 6 and
Figure 4 (showing that the California trading program regulates additional sectors).
140 See Comment Letter on The Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, supra note 18, at 13–14.
141 See Mohai & Saha, supra note 30, at 346.
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key message is that if equity is a priority, then achieving emissions reduc-
tions for EJ communities should not be left solely to the market, but
should be planned. Society should not wait and decide if what the market
yields for equity is satisfactory; instead, we should very intentionally and
purposefully decide what is needed. To do less is a failure to fulfill our
responsibility to strive for environmental justice.
